The role that time plays in Einstein's theory of gravity and in quantum mechanics is described, and the difficulties that these conflicting roles present for a quantum theory of gravity are described.
I. Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.
Reading this definition today, it is hard to see what the fuss is about. Time for us common folk is exactly Newton's true time. Taught about time since we were small, we know that there is something, insensible but present in the universe, called time, something that is separate from the other objects in the universe and the same everywhere. Newton would certainly not need to include his definition today, nor would he ascribe to common man that which he did.
It is precisely because we have so thoroughly absorbed Newton's lesson that we all have immense difficulty in coming to terms with the revolutions in physics of the twentieth century and that we in physics now have such difficulty in producing a unified theory of quantum mechanics and gravity.
It is the purpose of this paper to sketch the changes in the notion of time in twentieth century physics. I will show how in General Relativity the nature of time changed radically that of Newton and how gravity itself became an aspect of time. I will then examine the role time plays in quantum physics. Finally, I will sketch ways in which the lack of a proper understanding of time seems to be one of the chief impediments to developing a quantum theory of gravity.
The change began with Special Relativity, the first theory in which time lost some part of its absolute and invariant character. Time became, at least in some small sense, mutable.
It was precisely this conflict between a mutable notion of time and the absolute and unitary notion of time inherited from Newton that has caused consternation and confusion. This confusion came about not because of any innate violation of the sense of time that we are born with. Time for children is flexible and changeable, and certainly need not be the same here as it is there. Throughout our early years we were taught the lessons of Newton. Time was something out there, something that our watches measured, and something that really was the same everywhere. We learnt while very young that our excuse to the teacher that our time was different from the teacher's time was not acceptable.
The conclusions of Special Relativity came into direct conflict with these early lessons.
The 'Twins Paradox' is the epitome of this confusion, because there is, of course, no paradox at all except in the conflict between the notion of time as expressed in this theory and the notion of time as expressed by Newton. It is because we have so thoroughly absorbed Newton's definition of time that we become confused when time in Special Relativity behaves differently. In Special Relativity time, at least time as measured by any physical process, became not the measure of that unitary non-physical phenomenon of universal time, but a measure of distance within the new construct of 'space-time'. No-one expresses any surprise, or considers it a paradox, that the difference in the odometer readings on my car from the start of a trip to its end is not the same as the difference on your odometer for our trips from Vancouver to Toronto, especially if I went via Texas, while you went via the Trans Canada Highway. Distances are simply not functions only of the end points of the journey but depend on the complete history of the journey. Within Special Relativity the same is true of time. Times are no longer dependent only on the beginning and end of our journey, but are history-dependent and depend on the details of the journey themselves in exactly the same way that distances do. Mathematically this is expressed by having the time in Special Relativity be given by an extended notion of distance in an extended space called spacetime. Just as the spatial distance between two points depends on the details of the path joining the to points, so the temporal distance joining two points at two separate instants depends on the details of the path and the speed along that path joining the two points at the two instants.
Even though time as a measure of the duration of a process became mutable, Special Relativity was still a theory which retained some of the Newtonian picture. Just as space, for Newton, was another of those non-material but real invariant externals, so in Special Relativity space-time is also a real non-material invariant external. Instead of having two such concepts, i.e., space and time, Special Relativity has them unified into one single concept which retains most of the features of space.
This changed in General Relativity, Einstein's theory of gravity. Within Special Relativity, the immutability, the sameness, the independence of space and time from the other attributes of the universe, was kept inviolate. Although time, as measured by a watch, was path-dependent, it was the same everywhere, and was independent of the nature of matter around it. In General Relativity this aloofness vanished.
One often hears that what General Relativity did was to make time depend on gravity.
A gravitational field causes time to run differently from one place to the next, the so called 'gravitational red shift'. We hear about experiments like the one done by Pound and Rebka [2] in which the oscillation frequency of Iron Nuclei at the top and the bottom of the Harvard tower were found to differ, or about Vessot's [3] 'disposal' procedure of one of his Hydrogen masers in which such a maser was shot up 10,000 km above the earth by rocket before dropping into the Atlantic. During that journey, he noted that the maser ran more quickly at the top of its trajectory than at the bottom, in agreement with General Relativity to better than one part in five thousand. The lesson of these experiments would appear to be that gravity alters the way clocks run. Such a dependence of time on gravity would have been strange enough for the Newtonian view, but General Relativity is actually much more radical than that. A more accurate way of summarizing the lessons of General Relativity is that gravity does not cause time to run differently in different places (e.g., faster far from the earth than near it). Gravity is the unequable flow of time from place to place. It is not that there are two separate phenomena, namely gravity and time and that the one, gravity, affects the other. Rather the theory states that the phenomena we usually ascribe to gravity are actually caused by time's flowing unequably from place to place. This is strange. Most people find it very difficult even to imagine how such a statement could be true. The two concepts, time and gravity, are so different that there would seem to be no way that they could possibly have anything to do with each other, never mind being identical. That gravity could affect time, or rather could affect the rate at which clocks run, is acceptable, but that gravity is in any sense the same as time seems naively unimaginable.
To give a hint about how General Relativity accomplishes this identification, I will use an analogy. As with any analogy, there will be certain features that will carry the message that I want to convey, and I will emphasize these. There are other features of the analogy which may be misleading, and I will point out a few of these. The temptation with any analogy is to try to extend it, to think about the subject (in this case time and gravity) by means of the analogy and to ascribe to the theory (General Relativity) all aspects of the analogy, when in fact only some of the aspects are valid.
In this analogy I will use the idea from Special Relativity that some of the aspects of time are unified with those of space and that the true structure of space-time is in many ways the same as our usual notions of space. I will therefore use a spatial analogy to examine certain features of space-time in the vicinity of the earth. In order to be able to create a visual model, I will neglect two of the ordinary dimensions of space and will be concerned only with the physical spatial dimension of up and down along a single line through the center of the earth chauvenistically chosen to go through my home city of Vancouver. In this model, time will be represented by an additional spatial dimension, so that my full space-time model will be given by a two dimensional spatial surface. What I will now argue is that I can explain the most common manifestation of gravity that when I throw something up into the air, it slows down and finally stops its ascent and then comes back down to the surface of the earth (i.e., that which goes up must come down). Usually one ascribes this behaviour to the presence of a force called gravity which acts on the object, pulling it down toward the center of the earth. The crucial point is that one can alternatively explain this essential attribute of gravity by assuming that time flows unequably from place to place, without calling into play any 'force of gravity' at all.
Figure 1
The lens shape used to create the model of the space-time near the earth In order to develop the analogy, we must first interpret the phrase 'time flows unequably' in terms of our model. We can assume, for the purposes of our discussion, that the physical phenomena near the earth are the same from one time to the next. I.e., if we are to construct the two-dimensional space-time (up-down, and time) near the earth out of pieces representing the space-time at different instants, those pieces should all look the same. I will use pieces that look like lenses (see figure 1) . The direction across the lens I will take as time, and the direction along the lens I will take as space. These lenses have the feature that the physically measurable time, which Special Relativity teaches is just the distance across the lens, varies from place to place along the lens. I have thus interpreted the phrase 'the flow of time is unequable' as the statement that the distance (time) across each lens is unequal from place to place. I will now glue a large number of these lenses together along their long sides, giving us the two dimensional shape in figure 2, for which I will use the technical term 'beach ball'. I will take this beach ball to be a model of the space-time near the earth, a space-time made out of pieces on which time flows unequably from place to place.
Figure 2
The spacetime made by gluing together the lenses Let us now locate the surfaces of the earth in this model. The earth in the up-down direction has two surfaces-one here in Vancouver and the other one near Isle Crozet in the south Indian Ocean. Since the distance through the earth from Vancouver to this island is constant, the distance between the two strips on the surface of the beach ball must be constant from one time to the next to model this known fact about the earth accurately.
Furthermore, since we expect the system to be symmetric, we expect that 'up' here at Vancouver, and 'up' at Isle Crozet should behave in exactly the same way. Thus, the strips should be placed symmetrically on the beach ball. I thus have figure 3, with the two black strips representing the two surfaces of the earth and the region between the strips representing the interior of the earth. I stated that I would use this model to explain why, when something is thrown into the air, it returns to the earth. To do so, we must first decide how bodies move when plotted in this spacetime. I go back to the laws of motion first stated by Newton, in particular his first law of motion.
Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.
As I stated above, I will dispense with the idea of a gravitational force. I want to describe gravity not as a force but as the unequable flow of time from place to place. A body thrown up into the air is thus not acted upon by any forces. By the above law the body will continue its motion in a 'right', or as we would now say, a straight line. But what does 'straight' mean in this context of plotting the path of the body on the surface of this beach ball? I go back to one of the oldest definitions of a straight line, namely that a line is straight if it is the shortest distance between any two points along the line.
The beach ball is the surface of a sphere. On the surface of a sphere the shortest distance between two points is given by a great circle. Thus, applying this generalization of Newton's Law, the free motion of a body on the two dimensional space-time modeled by the beach ball will be some great circle around the ball. If we plot the vertical motion of an object thrown into the air at Vancouver on this model of the space-time, that plot will have the object following a great circle (straight line) on the surface of the beach ball. Consider the great circle given in figure 4. Starting at point A, it describes the behaviour of a particle leaving the surface of the earth. Initially, as time increases, the particle goes progressively further from the surface of the earth. As gravity is not a force, the particle continues to travel along the straight line (great circle). Eventually, the distance from the earth stops increasing and begins to decrease. The straight line, the great circle, re-intersects the band representing the surface of the earth at Vancouver at point B. I.e., the particle has returned to the surface of the earth, just as a real body thrown away from the surface of the earth will eventually return thereunto. A great circle leaving the earths surface at A and returning at B.
Although one cannot construct as simple a model of the situation, one can show that the same concept of the unequable flow of time can describe the behaviour of the moon as it orbits the earth. The moon also is following a straight line through the spacetime surrounding the earth, a spacetime constructed so that the flow of time far from the earth differs from its flow near the earth. The line is certainly not straight in space, but it is straight if plotted in space-time, straight in the sense of always following a path which either maximizes or minimizes the distance between any two points along the path.
With the above simple two-dimensional model one can also explain another aspect of gravity, namely the pressure we feel on the soles of our feet as we stand. Usually we ascribe this pressure to the response of the earth to the force of gravity pulling us down. As Einstein already pointed out in 1908, there is another situation in which we feel the same pressure, namely in an elevator accelerating upwards. In that case the pressure is not due to the resistance of the floor of the elevator to some force pulling us down; rather, it is the force exerted on us by the elevator in accelerating us upwards. Thus another possible explanation for the force we feel under our feet is that the surface of the earth is accelerating upwards.
Of course the immediate reaction is that this seems silly-if the earth at Vancouver were accelerating upwards and that at Isle Crozet were also accelerating upwards (since people there also feel the same force on the soles of their feet when they stand), the earth must surely be getting larger. The distance between two objects accelerating away from each other must surely be changing. In the presence of an unequable flow of time this conclusion does not necessarily follow, as I can again demonstrate with the beach ball. Both sides of the earth can be accelerating upwards even though the distance between them does not change. [4] In our beach ball model, the diameter of the earth (the distance between the two black lines) is clearly constant at all times. Let me carefully cut out one of the black strips, the one representing the surface of the earth at Vancouver say, as in figure 5. I will lay the strip out flat, as I have done with the peeled portion of the strip in figure 5 . The resulting graph is just the same as the graph of an accelerating object in flat space-time. Local (within the vicinity of the strip) to the surface of the earth, the space-time is the same as that around an accelerating particle, and one can therefore state that the surface of the earth at Vancouver is accelerating upwards. It is not following a straight line, It is following a curved line, and by Newton's first law must therefore have a force ( the one we feel on the soles of our feet) which causes that acceleration. It is the acceleration upward of the surface of the earth which leads to the sensation of a force on the soles of our feet. Figure 5 Unwrapping the surface near Vancouver onto a flat surface.
I must at this point insert a few warnings. As I stated earlier, an analogy will often contain features which are not applicable to the system being modeled. This holds true here as well. In the lenses I used to make up the space-time near the earth, the time decreases when we get further from the earth (i.e., the distance across the lens, and thus the time as measured by a clock, is less far away than nearby). However, the Vessot experiment showed that clocks far from the earth run faster not slower. Had we constructed our lenses so as to have them wider far from the earth than near the earth objects would have been repelled rather than being attracted to the surface of the earth as represented on the beach ball. HOwever the beach ball analogy also assumes that the notion of distance in time is identical to the notion of distance in space. In particular it assumes that distances in time and space obey the usual Pythagorian formula, that the square of the distance along the hypotenuse of a triangle is the sum of the squares along the other tow sides. However in General and Special Relativity space time is not strictly analogous to space. In particular, the Pythagorian theorem for time contains a minus sign-the distance in space-time looks like ∆x 2 − ∆t 2 -The distance along the hypotenuse equals the difference in the squares of the other two sides, if one of the sides is in the time direction. These two effects, the difference in sign and the difference in rate of flow between our model and in reality, cancel so that both the analogy and reality have the feature that thrown objects return to the earth.
Secondly, the feature that time reoccurs on the beach ball -i.e., by going forward in time you get back to where you started-is not shared by the structure of time near the earth. It is however interesting that once we have allowed time to become dynamic, once we namely the conception he ascribed to the common man (and which is today a conception utterly foreign to the common man).
II. QUANTUM MECHANICS AND TIME
Time is also an important player in the theory of quantum mechanics, but it is in many ways a very different player here than in General Relativity. It does not itself become a participant in the action, but compensates for this by assuming a much more important role in the interpretation of the theory. One of the key features in physics is that these fundamental structures are taken to be the same at all times.
At each instant of time there is a set of fundamental dynamical variables, the fundamental quantities in terms of which the physical nature of the world is described. In quantum mechanics these are represented mathematically as linear operators on some Hilbert space.
For example, if our world of discourse consists of some single particle, the fundamental variables are position and momentum. These are represented by Hermitian operators, and all physical attributes are assumed to be represented by functions of these operators. Furthermore, as long as one's world of discourse remains that single particle, these same variables will maintain their fundamental role. On the other hand, if our world of discourse is a quantum field theory, (e.g., electromagnetism), these physical attributes will be the value of the field at each spatial point, together with the conjugate momentum for that particular field value.
It is one of the peculiar assumptions in physics that for any physical situation, the fundamental set of physical attributes in terms of which we describe that situation are the same at all times. The universe of discourse does not change from time to time. This is of course very different from most other fields of human endeavour, in which any attempt to pretend that the essential entities in terms of which the world is constructed are always the same would be silly. Institutions fail and disappear, department heads retire. In physics, on the other hand, one believes that the physical world can be described at all times by the same physical structures, and that the changes in the world are simply the changing relations between these fundamental entities or changes in the values of their properties.
One can regard this as either an admission by physicists that they will limit their interest only to those situations in which such a universality and invariance of the fundamental attributes is accurate or as the claim that all situations, no matter how complex and how changeable, can be described by such a single unchanging set of fundamental attributes. The almost universal belief among physicists is that the latter is the case, that at heart there are some universal fundamental structures that can be used to describe any physical process in the world.
Let me state this assumption in a slightly more technical vein. To do so I will review the basic mathematical structure of quantum mechanics. I would refer the reader who is not familiar with quantum mechanics to various books on the subject or to the article by Shimony [6] . In quantum mechanics, the basic entities used to model the physical world are linear operators on a Hilbert space. A Hilbert space is a collection of things, called vectors, which you can add together to get another vector or which you can multiply by a complex number to get another vector. I will denote these vectors by |name where 'name' is simply some symbol to name a particular vector. Thus linearity is expressed by the statement that if |a and |b are both vectors, then α|a + β|b is also a vector for arbitrary complex numbers α and β. These vectors also have associated with them a concept of 'inner product', designated by a|b which is a complex number associated with any two vectors |a and |b .
It is chosen such that a|a is always real, a|b + c = a|b + a|c , and αa|αa = |α| It would be at least conceptually possible that the Hilbert space, and thus the operators that act on the Hilbert space, could change from time to time. One could imagine that certain things which were possible, which were measurable, at least in principle, at one time, did not even exist at some other time, that the set of all physical quantities could be different at one time from the next. However this is not the case in quantum mechanics. The physical variables, the set of operators and the Hilbert space on which those operators act, are assumed to be the same at all times. As with classical physics, the change in the world that we want to describe or explain lies not in a change to the fundamental structures of the world, but in a change to the relation of these structures to each other or in the 'values' that these operators have.
This first role of time might appear trivial. Time plays a role in designating the set of fundamental attributes in terms of which we describe the world. Of course the physicist can decide to focus on some smaller set of fundamental attributes of the world that is of interest at any given time. But these changing simpler structures are not produced by some aspect of time, they are produced by the changing focus of the physicist. The belief is strongly held that at heart there exists some one set of universal operators, some one global Hilbert space, which can be used (barring technical difficulties) to describe everything in the world throughout all time.
New theories may demand new assumptions. The possibility exists that the world could change from time to time in some fundamental way, not just in detail. I will argue below that such genuine novelty may be needed in order to describe the quantum evolution of the universe.
II) Having defined the mathematical structures used by the theory to describe the world, one must then try to use them to explain the world. In particular, one wishes to use the theory to explain the change we see about us. Since the mathematical structure is explained are constant, the explanation for change must be in terms of changing relations amongst the fundamental entities and changes in the the relation between the mathematical structures and the physical world. This explanation is done via the equations of motion, equations relating the entities describing the world at one time to those describing the world at another time. 
A is any dynamical operator representing some aspect of the physical world, and H is a special operator in the theory, the Hamiltonian, usually identified with the energy of the system.
It is by means of these dynamical equations of the theory, these changes in identification from time to time of the operators with the physical reality, that one hopes to encode the dual characteristics of the world as envisioned by physicists. That dual character is one of a fundamental identity from one instant of time to the next (at all times one can describe the world by the same set of operators), together with the possibility and reality of change and transmutation, which is so much a part of the world around us.
III) Quantum mechanics arose out of, and encodes within its interpretation, a very uncomfortable feature of the world, that the world seems to operate on the basis of insufficient cause. Things just happen, without our being able to ascribe any sufficient cause to explain the details of what occurred. Given two absolutely identical situations (causes), the outcomes (effects) can differ. This feature caused Einstein so much intellectual pain that he rejected the theory, even though he had been a key player in its foundation. It is still one of the most disconcerting aspects of the theory and the world. It seems to call into question the very purpose of physics, and it lies at the heart of the disquiet felt by even some of the best physicists [7] . However, all the evidence indicates that nature operates in accordance with quantum mechanics. One's first reaction would be to say that somehow at heart the universe surely operates with sufficient cause-that when we say that identical situations produce differing results, it is really that the situations were not identical, but that there were overlooked features of the world which caused the differing outcomes. However, the evidence is that this is not how the world operates, that God truly does "play dice" [8] .
How is this element of insufficient cause encoded in the quantum theory, and how does time, the subject of this paper, enter into this encoding? As mentioned above, each physical attribute of the world is represented by an operator on the Hilbert space. But physical If one of the vectors in the Hilbert space represents the actual state of the world, then the theory tells us what the probability is that, given the state of the world, the value of the physical attribute corresponding to that operator takes some given value. I.e., the theory does not tell us what the value of the attribute is, it tells us what the probability is that it has some value.
How do those values correspond to out experience of the physical world and our experience with those attributes that the system has? In clasical physics any attribute of a physical system is taken to have some unique value at all times. In quantum theory the situation is more difficult. It seems to be impossible to hold to the classical notion of each attribute having a value at all times. However there are certain situations, called measurement situations in which the attribute is taken to have some value, because it has been measred to have a value. Each operator representing a physical value has in general many eigenvalues, and thus the attribute has many potential values. The assumption is that at any given time, if a "measurement" is made of the attribute, one and only one of these potential values can be realised. The theory does not specify which value will be realised, but rather gives probabilities for the various possibilities. Furthermore, these probabilities are such that the probability of obtaining two (or more) distinct values is zero, and the probability of obtaining any one of the complete set of values is unity. From the definition of probabilities, if a and a ′ are two separate possible values for an operator A, then the impossibility of having two separate values gives P rob(a and a ′ ) = 0. This then leads to P rob(a or a ′ ) = P rob(a) + P rob(a ′ ). Furthermore, if we ask for the probability that one of the eigenvalues is realized, we have
where the set is the whole set of all possible eigenvalues of A.
Again this feature seems obvious, but time enters into this statement in a crucial way.
The statement that one and only one value is obtained is true only at some given specific time. It is simply not true without the temporal condition 'at one time'. If we do not specify time, my car can have many different positions (and it did today). It is only at a single time that we can state that the car had one and only one position.
This seemingly trivial fact is encoded into quantum theory at the most fundamental level. The probability of an eigenvalue is given by the square of the dot (or more usually called the inner) product between the two vectors, or in symbolic terms, the probability that the operator A has value a is given by the square of the dot product between the eigenvector |a associated with the eigenvalue a, and the state vector of the system, written |ψ , so that
The statement that only one value can be realized leads to
and that at least one value must be realized gives
It is because of this physical demand that we can use the eigenvectors of Hermitian operators as the models for physical attributes-The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Hermitian operators have exactly this required structure.
The third role that time plays in the theory, then, is that, given some physical attribute, that attribute can take one of a whole range of values, but at any single instant in time it can take at most one of those values (the values are statistically independent), and it must take at least one of those values (the values are complete).
As with the first property of time, this property seems almost to be trivial. It is at least very difficult to see how it could be changed without completely altering the structure of quantum mechanics. Furthermore it would seem to reflect a fundamental attribute of the real world. However, as I will argue that quantum gravity may require such a change.
IV) The fourth role that time plays is in setting the contingencies or conditions for the predictions of the theory. Theories in physics are designed to be broad. They are, especially if they are to be fundamental theories, designed to be applicable in any and all conceivable situations. They are generic and not specific, universal and not particular. But any experiment, any experience of the world is specific and particular. How can the theory be applied to these specific cases?
In classical physics, the answer lies in the 'initial' conditions. Although the theory itself is universal and generic, the specific contingencies of any particular situation can be encoded so as to make the predictions of the theory specific and particular. The theory itself identifies the dynamical variables in terms of which one will describe any situation. The equations of motion specify how the values of these variables at any one time are related to those at any other time. To complete the picture, therefore, one must specify the variables at some one time.
Given the values of all of the variables at one time, the values at any other time are completely determined by the theory through the equations of motion. This specification of the values of all of the variables is given the name in classical physics of 'initial conditions'.
Although the term 'initial' is used, there is no need that the values be specified at a time earlier than the time of interest, or even that the variables all be specified at one time. to subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes. [9] This is not true for quantum mechanics, although three hundred years of classical physics still exerts its views on quantum theory, and quantum mechanics is often treated as though it were cast in the same mold.
As mentioned, quantum mechanics is a theory of insufficient cause. The complete specification of the theory at one instant of time is not sufficient to completely specify the outcomes of any experiment at all other times. Some things will 'just happen'. As a result the effect of the setting of the conditions on the predictions of the theory are much more subtle, complex and profound than they are in classical physics.
Let us begin with the simplest text book case. Let us say that at some time t 0 , we know
[10] that the dynamic variable A has the value a. As I stated, the value a must be one of the eigenvalues of A and has associated a vector in the Hilbert space called the eigenvector, which I will write |a >. Since we know the physical variable A to have value a, we need that the probability that it has value a be unity, and the probability that it have value a ′ different from a be zero (it can by property III have only one value at a given time.) As stated previously, the probability of having a value a ′ for some vector in the Hilbert space |ψ is given by the square of the dot product between the eigenvector |a ′ and the state vector |ψ . It is one of the fortunate features of Hermitian operators, that a ′ |a = 0 for eigenvectors associated with different eigenvalues of the same operator. If we choose the state vector to be |ψ = |a , we will precisely encode the belief that we know the value of property A to be a. The state vector for the system is thus the way we have of encoding the conditions under which we want the theory to deliver answers to us. In particular we choose the state vector to encode the information that we know that some physical property has some definite value. Now, for any other operator B, at a later time say, we can calculate the probability that the physical variable represented by B has value b by the square of the dot product | b|a | 2 .
Note that this does not in general lead to the statement that the system has some value b at that later time, as it would in classical physics. It leads to the statement that there is some probability that it has the value b. However, what value it will actually be found to have This rule, that later knowledge supersedes earlier, has also led to comments that quantum mechanics is, in some sense, inherently time asymmetric. After all, the latter supersedes the former, not the other way around. However, the appearance of time asymmetry is due to the fact that the question being asked is inherently time asymmetric. The latter replaces the former if one is asking questions about the system at a even later time. The latter does not supersede the former in other cases. To highlight this point let us ask a different type of question. Given that I know that A has value a at time t 0 , and that B had value b at a later time t 1 , what are the probabilities that C had value c at an intermediate time t 2 between t 0 and t 1 ?.
As specific examples are often more comprehensible than general arguments, I will present a specific example, but the conclusions drawn will have general applicability. As always in the field of interpretation, one tries to work with as simple a system as possible so as not to obscure the essential point with a forest of technical detail. I will therefore take the ubiquitous spin . We are going to assume that at some time, say one of 9AM, 10AM and 11AM, we know that the physical system has a value for the x component of the spin of + 1 2
, Similarly at another one of those three times, we know that the system has a value of + at all times. Furthermore since spin is a vector, the midway component, let me call it S θ , will just be an appropriate sum of the two known vector components, and must have a value of In quantum mechanics on the other hand, the situation is more complicated. There are in principle six different answers, depending on the times at which the system was assumed to have had those values in relation to the time about which we are asking the question. Let me write S a S b S c to designate that the condition of S a having some value is for 9AM, S b for 10AM and S c at 11AM. The various possibilities for the temporal order of the conditions are the six permutations
I will concentrate on the first four of these. Although one can say something also about the last two cases, the potential controversy would hide the point I am trying to make. In the first two cases, the answers quantum mechanically are different, while classically they must be the same. In the first the value of S y supersedes that of S x in determining the probabilities for the two possible outcomes of S θ . In the second the value of S x supersedes that of S y . In each case 9AM condition is irrelevant, because the 10AM condition completely supersedes it. One says that the state of the system is the state determined by the 10AM condition, i.e., is the + 1 2 eigenstate of S y and S x respectively, and the prediction for the probability that S θ has value 1 2 at 11AM is 1 2
(1 + sin(θ)) in case a, and 1 2
(1 + cos(θ)) in case b. Note that these are not the same as each other.
The cases c and d both also have unambiguous answers in quantum mechanics, and both are identical. The probability that S θ will have value
This probability function has at least one peculiar property. We see that the probability of measuring S θ to have value is unity (certainty) both when θ has the value zero and when θ has the value 90 o . I.e., the probability that one will measure S x ≡ S 0 at the intermediate is unity and the probability to measure S y ≡ S 90 to have value 1 2 is also unity. It is however easy to prove that there exists no state vector whatsoever in the Hilbert space of this spin 1 2 particle which could give this result. I.e., there exists no |ψ such that
We learn from this example that the temporal ordering of the conditions that one places on the question that one asks of the theory are crucial to obtaining answers from the theory.
Unlike classical mechanics, the conditions cannot in general be mapped back onto initial conditions. Time, and in particular temporal ordering, is needed in a crucial way not just to set up the dynamical relations, but also to extract sensible predictions from the theory.
Another lesson we can learn from this example is that quantum mechanics does not have a inherent time order to it. If it had, one would have expected the answers to conditions c and d to differ. After all the temporal order is completely reversed in the latter with respect to the former. However the predictions are identical. The fact that a and c differ, even though just the temporal order of S y and S θ have changed is no surprise since the condition on S x at 9AM in both cases ensures that these are not the time reverse of each other. This is of possible relevance to the discussion that Roger Penrose gives in his book, "The Emperor's New Mind". He argues that quantum mechanics itself implicitly contains a time ordering, that the specification of the conditions leads to a clear and natural time ordering.
The relevant section occurs on page 357, where he describes an experiment in which a lamp is placed in front of a half silvered mirror. One now places a "photon" detector just in front of the mirror, to detect when the lamp sends a photon toward the mirror, and a detector behind the mirror. One finds that although the probability is only 1 2 that the second one will have detected a photon when the first one does, the probability is unity that the first one will have when the second one is found to have detected one. He then adduces this as an argument in favour of the position that quantum measurement contains within itself an arrow of time (as well as a time ordering.) I.e., the placing the condition on the photon exiting and asking for the probability that the photon entered is not the same as placing the condition on the photon entering and asking the probability that it exited. answer is that the photons must have come in through port A and exited through either of ports C and D. We know that there is no quantum state which would allow a photon to come in through port C and exit, with unit probability, through port A, while states exist for which the photon could enter port A and exit with 50-50 probability through port C or
D. Does this imply a time-asymmetry in quantum mechanics as Penrose implies?
The problem is that there is something to be explained in either direction of time. Ports A and B are completely symmetric. Why is there then an asymmetry in the readings at the two ports, i.e., port A is the only one with any detections. The answer that Penrose would
give when we interpret A as the input port is that there is a light bulb at A and not one at The fact that quantum mechanics itself does not pick out a direction in time was recognized already over 20 years ago by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [11] . They also suggested the formalism for handling cases in which the conditions do not necessarily precede the times at which the predictions are to be made. That formalism has been independently rediscovered a number of times since by others(including me), which illustrates the lack of impact that this fundamental insight has had at least on the teaching of the subject. It also illustrates the fact that the very different role played by the conditions in quantum mechanics from that in classical mechanics has still not been instilled into the thoughts of most of the practitioners of the subject. In Appendix A I have outlined this formalism. For a more detailed exposition I would refer the reader to the literature.
Aharonov and collaborators have recently been emphasizing the peculiarities of situations in which one sets conditions both before and after the time at which one wishes to discuss the possible outcomes of experiments. Because of the paradoxical nature of some of these results, I will present one of their examples here [12] . This is done to further reinforce the point I am making about the different behaviour of the conditions in quantum mechanics from the behaviour of initial conditions in classical mechanics and in addition illustrates the point that the subject of knowledge and the relation of knowledge to physical measurements can be subtle in quantum mechanics.
The spin of a system in quantum mechanics is a vector S, and represents an internal type of angular momentum for the system. Angular momentum in quantum mechanics has a number of strange properties, one of which is that the angular momentum cannot take on any arbitrary value. The eigenvalues for the operator corresponding to the total spin, namely S · S, take on only a range of values of the form s(s + 1), where s is an integer divided by two. I.e. the allowed values are discrete. Furthermore, if the total spin is s (which is the conventional shorthand for saying that S · S has value s(s + 1)), then any component of the spin can only have values lying between −s and s and the value must differ from s by a whole number. Consider some spin s system At time t = 0, we measure the value of the spin in the x direction (i.e., the x component of the spin), and find it to have value s (i.e., the maximum amount). At time t 1 we measure the spin in the direction lying in the x − z plane half way between the x and z axes. (i.e., we measure the operator
This measurement we carry out inexactly, to an accuracy of only of order ± √ s. Finally at time t 2 we measure the spin in the z direction, and again find it to be s. Note that if the inexactness of the measurement is of order √ s, then for a sufficiently large s, .4s >> √ s, i.e. the error is much smaller than the deviation from the maximum value.
Let me put a bit more flesh onto the above bones. The initial and final measurements are assumed to be perfect exact measurements. For the intermediate measurement we will institute the requirement that the measurement be inexact by coupling the spin system to another system which will be our measuring apparatus. The measuring apparatus will be assumed to be a free particle of infinite mass and zero potential energy-i.e. I will assume that the free Hamiltonian of the particle is zero. (This is supposed to represent say the dynamics of a massive apparatus pointer.) The coupling will be taken to be such that the interaction between the apparatus and the spin system is instantaneous (i.e., a delta function in time) and is proportional to the momentum of the particle times the spin. I.e. the full Hamiltonian for the system is
In the Heisenberg representation, we find that the dynamics of the apparatus is given by
The inaccuracy of the measuring apparatus will be introduced by assuming that it is the value of q which will be used to infer the measured value of S 45 . I.e., we will measure q exactly after the coupling between the particle and the spin has completed and use that value to infer the value of the 45 o component. To obtain the value of this component we must subtract the final value of q from the initial value of q since the coupling to the spin causes the value of q to change. To mimic the inaccurate measurement, I will assume that the initial value of q is not exactly known, that the initial state of the apparatus is such that the initial q has a spread in possible values over a range ∆q = σ ≈ √ s. I will take the initial wave function for q to be a Gaussian, centered at 0 with standard deviation of σ.
. This measuring apparatus does behave like a proper apparatus should. If we assume that the state of the spin system is in fact an eigenstate of S 45 , the final probability distribution of q values is just a Gaussian, centered around that eigenvalue of S 45 , with width σ. I.e., the best estimate for the value of S 45 will just be the value measured for q with an uncertainty in the inferred value of ±σ. I have carried out the calculation for the situation presented in our problem above, namely that S x had value s before the measurement and S z had 
Figure 7
The Probability distribution for the pointer measuring the spin with uncertainty .5-Maximum spin=20
In figure 8 , I have increased σ to 1, and the measurement is not as accurate. There are still a series of peaks, but these are no longer centered on the values we would have expected for the spin, i.e. they are no longer centered on the integers. In figure 9 , with σ = 2 this trend away from the naive expectation has continued. The spacing between the peaks is definitely greater than unity, and the peaks in the probability distribution have begun to extend beyond the maximum possible value for the spin, namely 20. Finally, in Figure 10 , σ has the value of 5. This is far too coarse to be able to distinguish individual spins, which have a spacing of unity. However we notice that the expected value of q is now about 28, 40% higher than the maximum possible value that the spin is supposed to be able to have. The measurement of q would give an inferred value of the spin higher than it could possibly be. One might at this complain that the measuring apparatus is poor, that it does not measure the spin
properly. For almost all normal situations it is ,however, a good measuring apparatus for the spin. In all normal situations, in which one specified only an initial condition and not a final condition as well, the outcome would have been exactly what one would have expected-namely a sum of Gaussian peaks centered around the allowed values of the spin.
It is because one has instituted both initial and final conditions that the measurements have produced the strange result of a value much higher than the maximum allowed value. 
III. QUANTUM GRAVITY
In this section I will argue that attempts to quantize a theory like General Relativity, in which time plays the central role, will potentially meet with problems in all four of roles that time plays in quantum mechanics. I say potentially, because we do not at present have a quantum theory of gravity. There may be some subtle way in which the difficulties can be avoided which we do not at present recognize. The ultimate theory of quantum gravity may be so different from our present notions that the role of time will not even be an issue.
(As an example, quantum mechanics itself was so different from classical theory that issues which arose in the latter were not even a question in quantum theory. Furthermore, the formalism of quantum mechanics itself suggested interpretations which would never have occurred in classical physics.) Despite the difficulty of discussing a non-existent theory, it may be worthwhile to look at the difficulties in the hope that a expect that Hilbert space and the physical operators to be time independent? I will tackle the second question, and leave the first to the next section. One of the striking predictions of Einstein's thoery of gravity was that not only was time intimately involved in gravity but so was space. In particular one of the first set of solutions to the theory were solutions in which space became dynamic, and the universe as a whole grew in size. These solutions, first discovered by Friedman, and hated at first by Einstein, led to what we now know as the Big Bang theory for the origin of the universe. In the popular imagination, the Big Bang is like an anarchists bomb, in which at some moment the universe, the cosmic egg,
exploded, and what we now see are the fragments of that explosion hurtling away from us.
As usual, the popular image misses the most radical part of the theory. It is not that there was some explosion in a preexistent space, but rather that the universe was born very small, and as time went on, the universe created more space for itself to live in. The reason that we see the distant galaxies recede from us is not that they are moving away as the remnants of some inconceivable initial force, but rather that the distance between us and them is increasing due to the creation of new space between us and them at a more or less constant rate. Because of this increase in the amount of space, anything in the universe is continually being diluted. In particular, anything which now has some macroscopic scale, very early on had a much much smaller scale (a factor of about 10 25 on the most naive assumptions, and a much larger factor difference if inflation actually occurred).
Does this also mean that because there was less space early on there were also fewer physical attributes that the universe had? My suggestion is yes. Modern physics sees the fundamental structures which make up the universe as being fields. How then do we describe or explain the change that we experience in the world around us? This is one of the questions that most bedevils any putative theory of quantum gravity.
Although many have thought about the problem, and some have felt that they have solved it to their own satisfaction, there is no generally accepted answer. Moreover I feel that all of the suggested answers (including my own) have severe difficulties. How can change be described in a theory where the only valid physical quantities that do not change? III) Probabilities: One of the suggested resolutions of the problem mentioned above is to select one of the variables of the unconstrained theory is selected as the time. The physically intuitive reasoning is that time in reality is an unobservable feature of the world anyway. What actually passes for time is the reading on various and sundry pieces of physical apparatus called clocks. If you as a child are late for school, it is not because your arrival at the school is late in relation to any abstract notion of time. It is rather that the reading on the face of your teacher's watch is later than the reading at which school was supposed to start. Note that this approach is in direct contradiction to Newton's approach as stated in the quote which began this paper. Time, according to the proponents of this view is exactly the common view, and Newton's non-relationist view is wrong. The key problem with this approach is that it removes the foundation for the third aspect of time in quantum mechanics. At any one time, any variable has one and only one value. It is this which physically justifies the whole Hilbert space structure of quantum mechanics. But any real physical watches are imperfect. It can be proven that any realist watch not only has a finite probability to stop, it has a finite probability to run backwards. Now as long as the watch is simply the measure of some outside phenomenon, one could take these probabilities into account. If, however, time is defined to be the reading on the face of the clock, the question as to whether or not the clock can stop or run backward is moot-it cannot by definition.
However the other question now raises itself, namely what basis have we for the assertion that at a time a physical quantity can have one and only one value. At the same readings on a broken watch, a physical quantity can have an arbitrarily large number of readings.
There is furthermore no reason why the probabilities should add up to unity if the events are not mutually exclusive. They could add up to far more than unity, and still be in accord with probability theory if they are independent, mutually exclusive events. What is the mathematical structure which should be used if time no longer plays this third role of defining he sets of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities?
IV) We argued in part IV) of the last section that the setting of conditions in quantum mechanics was more subtle and rich than in classical theory. In particular, the setting of conditions is not equivalent to the setting of initial conditions. Furthermore, unless the experiments were structured so that the conditions always preceded the questions, the usual use of a state vector to encode the conditions was inapplicable. How does this apply to the attempts to quantize gravity?
One of the approaches is to regard the constraints as a sort of Schroedinger's equation However in light of the discussion I gave in the section on quantum mechanics, the problem of setting the conditions in quantum theory is not a problem of initial conditions.
In particular in the case in which the definition of time, of before and after, is problematic, one does not expect a wave function to properly encode the setting of conditions. Since the physical answers differ substantially when the time ordering is changed, the lack of such a time ordering in the quantum theory of gravity makes this a critical issue. In what order are the conditions to be set? If a wave function is not the right formalism for describing the theory, what is the correct formalism?
As should be obvious, the conflicting roles of time in gravity and in quantum theory have raised a number of difficult issues. Although the field seems no nearer resolution than it did forty years ago, it does seem that the effort to understand the problems has given us a much better understanding of the roles played by time in both general relativity and in quantum theory.
One of the only people to try to come to terms with the above difficulties in the formulation of quantum theory for gravity has been Jim Hartle [15] . In a series of recent papers he has been applying the consistent histories formalism (briefly sketched in the Appendix A) to a the problems of Quantum Gravity. His attempts are still in an embryonic stage, but the formulation is one in which the usual operators on a Hilbert space approach of conventional quantum mechanics is abandoned. Instead, starting from Feynman's 'sum over histories' approach, he casts quantum gravity directly in terms of histories of observation, histories which need not be tied to particular instants of time or locations in space. It incorporates the possibility for the setting of conditions at arbitrary instants and ordering in time. It might also allow one to speak of situations in which the possible observables can change in time, as in the concerns above regarding part I . The exact nature of time, of dynamics and change, has still to be elucidated in my opinion, but it is possible that our present notions of time can arise from the theory as an approximation. But to go into the details of his attempts would make this paper much larger than it already is, and I will refer the reader to his papers instead.
IV. APPENDIX A
In this appendix, I want to introduce the formalism, developed by Aharonov, Lebowitz and Bergmann [11] , by Griffiths [16] , by me [17] , and by Gell-Mann and Hartle [18] to describe quantum mechanics under conditions in which the conditions are set at arbitrary times and not solely before the time of interest. This formalism is used by all of the above people in different ways, and Griffiths and Gell-Mann and Hartle have tried to use it to define a new interpretational scheme for quantum mechanics. I will not go into the details of that scheme here but refer the reader to the literature. To develop the formalism, we must introduce some notation. We will again operate in the Heisenberg representation. For any operator A with discrete eigenvalue a, we can define a Hermitian projection operator P a , such that P 2 a = P a , such that it commutes with A, and such that it obeys AP a = aP a .
To use the language of Hartle and Gell-Mann, we now define a "history" as a sequence of eigenvalues of various operators at different times, a 1 , b 2 , ..., z n where a 1 is an eigenvalue of A at time t 1 , etc., and t 1 > t 2 > ... > t n . They define an operator
. This operator represents the successive projection onto the eigenstates of the sequence of operators A 1 , ..., Z n . Let the "vector" of eigenvalues
represent a history, so we can write
Now define the "decoherence" function
whereṽ is assumed to be another 'history' of possible outcomes of the same sequence of operators as in v. ρ I is the initial density matrix, which I will discuss below. T r denote the trace of the the operator (the sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix). We will divide the components of v into two categories. The one category is those values which we know-i.e. those which we wish to use to set the conditions on the questions we ask of the theory, and the subset which we do not know, i.e., those for which we wish to determine the probability of that particular outcome. Let me designate the first subset ("known") by K(v), and the second by Q(v). Then one finds that
where the sum is over all possible v obeying this condition. Notice that we have chosen the same history in both slots of the decoherence function D in order to define the probabilities.
It is worth pointing out features of this formula. If all of the conditions imposed occur at a time before any a question, then the above formula simplifies. (I.e., if K(v) all occur before Q(v), the above may be written as
We can thus replace the ρ I by a new ρ = C(K)ρ I C † (K). Now ρ I in the above is supposed to represent the initial "density matrix" for the system. We note from this paragraph, that in reality the initial density matrix represents either some theoretical prejudice about the truly initial state of the system, or represents the cumulative effect of all of those conditions placed on the system at times earlier than the time in question. We also note that we are free either to change the initial density matrix in this way once we set more a priori conditions, or to simply include the extra conditions in the formula as parts of the K terms in the history. The first option, changing the density matrix, is the process known as 'reduction of the wave packet' in the conventional approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
It is useful at this point to mention that the Decoherence functional has been made the center of a new interpretation of quantum mechanics. In my presentation above, the results are all just a minor modification of the standard interpretation of the theory to unusual situations. However, Griffiths, and Hartle and Gell-Mann have suggested a more radical use of this decoherence function, called the consistent histories approach. One of the properties of this function is that the probability of outcome of some individual measurement depends on which other measurements are assumed to have been made. I.e., the probabilities of the various possible outcomes of say the operator B 2 in the above depends on whether or not Z n is included in the history, and on precisely which operator (and thus physical quantity)
Z n represents. This just corresponds to the usual quantum condition that the outcome of measurements of say the position of a particle depends on whether or not I earlier measured the momentum of that particle, Assume furthermore that r i is in Q(v), and that we want the probability of some specific subhistory Q(v ′ ) independent of the value of r i . Now given P rob(Q ′ , r i ), the probability of Q ′ independent of the value of r − i is just P rob(q ′ ) = any pair, the probabilities will not be the same.
It is of interest [19] that one can also generalize the above formula to include the setting of final conditions in a final density matrix. I.e., we can generalize the formula by including a ρ F as a final condition.
.
Again ρ F will represent either a prejudice about the probabilities of the final state of the system (e.g., one may want to calculate the probabilities in ones experiment conditional on the laboratory still existing at the end of the experiment) or the accumulated effect of the parts of K(v) which occur after all of the times associated with the Q(v).
New York, 1961). Note that the correct initial conditions for most physical theories are not those given by Laplace.
[10] Throughout this paper I use the term 'knowledge' instead of the more traditional "measurement" to refer to the process by which the general formalism of the theory is made to conform to the particulars of the world at a specific time, place and condition. The latter term I feel causes too much confusion to be of use in discussions of the foundation of quantum mechanics.In the interpretation of quantum mechanics, 'Measurement' has two separate meanings-it can refer to the acquisition of knowledge about the physical world, or it can refer to the physical process which accompanies that acquisition of knowledge. In the latter case, as a physical process, measurements are a part of the physical world and should therefore be analyzable in terms of one's theory of the physical world ( quantum mechanics in this case). I will retain the term measurement for this meaning. In the former case, the term refer to the activity of making the theory correspond to the specific peculiarities of the physical world one wishes to study, and play a more axiomatic, and thus unanalyzable, role in the theory. I will use the term knowledge, instead of measurement, for this meaning. Thus, in order to avoid the dangers in the confusion between the physical and axiomatic roles that the term measurement plays in quantum theory, I use the term knowledge throughout for the latter activity and measurement is reserved for the former meaning. This of course raises its own set of problems, as the controversy about the nature of knowledge is probably even deeper than controversy about the nature of measurement. However two seperate terms are needed to differentiate between the two seperate aspects of the theory usually conflated in the term measurement. Furthermore, the emphasis that the use of the term 'knowledge' places on the acquisition of information about the world as a human activity, is a more accurate portrayal of the role played in quantum theory. However, if the use of the term 'knowledge' bothers the reader, it can be replaced almost everywhere by the more traditional term 'measurement'.
